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Abstract
We extend the semi-parametric estimation method for dynamic discrete choice models us-
ingHotzandMiller’s(1993)conditionalchoiceprobability(CCP)approachtothesettingwhere
individuals may have hyperbolic discounting time preferences and may be naive about their
time inconsistency. We illustrate the proposed estimation method with an empirical applica-
tion of adult women’s decisions to undertake mammography to evaluate the importance of
present bias and naivety in the under-utilization of this preventive health care. Our results
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Dynamic discrete choice models have been used to understand a wide range of economic be-
havior. The early dynamic discrete choice models that are empirically implemented tend to be
parametric;1 but recently, a growing list of authors have addressed the non- or semi-parametric
identiﬁcation of dynamic discrete choice models. The earliest attempt in this regard is Hotz and
Miller (1993) which pioneered the approach of using conditional choice probabilities to infer about
choice-speciﬁc continuation values. Rust (1994a, 1994b) showed that the discount factor in stan-
dard dynamic discrete choice models are generically not identiﬁed; Magnac and Thesmar (2002)
expanded Rust’s non-identiﬁcation results, and proposed exclusion restrictions that lead to the
identiﬁcation of the standard discount factor.
All of the above-mentioned literature model the impatience of the decision makers by assum-
ing that agents discount future streams of utility or proﬁts exponentially over time. As is now well
known, exponential discounting is not just an analytically convenient assumption; without this
assumption, intertemporal marginal rates of substitution will change as time passes, and prefer-
ences will be time-inconsistent [see Strotz (1956, p.172)]. A recent theoretical literature has built
on the work of Strotz (1956) and others to explore the consequences of relaxing the standard as-
sumption of exponential discounting. Drawing both on experimental research and on common
intuition, economists have built models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting to capture the tendency
of decision makers to seize short-term rewards at the expense of long-term preferences.2 This lit-
erature studies the implications of time-inconsistent preferences, and their associated problems of
self-control, for a variety of economic choices and environments.3
A small list of empirical papers that attempted to estimate dynamic models with hyperbolic
discounting time preferences have followed the parametric approach (Fang and Silverman 2009,
Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman 2007 and Paserman 2008).4 Fang and Silverman (2009) empiri-
1The earliest formulation and estimation of parametric dynamic discrete choice models include Wolpin (1984) for
fertility choice, Miller (1984) for occupational choice, Pakes (1986) for patent renewal, and Rust (1987) for bus engine
replacement.
2A body of experimental research, reviewed in Ainslie (1992) and Loewenstein and Elster (1992), indicates that
hyperbolic time discounting may parsimoniously explain some basic features of the intertemporal decision making
that are inconsistent with simple models with exponential discounting. Speciﬁcally, standard decision models with
exponential discounting are not easy to reconcile with commonly observed preference reversals: subjects choose the
larger and later of two prizes when both are distant in time, but prefer the smaller but earlier one as both prizes draw
nearer to the present (see Rubinstein 2003, however, for an alternative explanation of preference reversals).
3For example, models of time-inconsistent preferences have been applied by Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999a,b) to consumption and savings; by Barro (1999) to growth; by Gruber and Koszegi (2001) to smoking de-
cisions; by Krusell, Kurus ¸c ¸u, and Smith (2002) to optimal tax policy; by Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) to belief formation;
by Fang and Silverman (2004) to welfare program participation and labor supply of single mothers with dependent
children; and by Della Vigna and Paserman (2005) to job search.
4Also related, Arcidiacono, Sieg and Sloan (2007) estimate a parametric forward-looking dynamic discrete choice
model of smoking and heavy drinking for late-middle age men in the Health and Retirement Studey (HRS) and ﬁnd
1cally implement a dynamic structural model of labor supply and welfare program participation
for never-married mothers with potentially time-inconsistent preferences. Using panel data on
the choices of single women with children from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY
1979), they provide estimates of the degree of time-inconsistency, and of its inﬂuence on the wel-
fare take-up decision. For the particular population of single mothers with dependent children,
they estimate the present bias factor and the standard discount factor to be 0.338 and 0.88 respec-
tively, implying a one-year ahead discount rate of 238%. Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2007)
use the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) to estimate time preferences - both short and long
run discount rates – from a structural buffer stock consumption model that includes many realistic
features such as stochastic labor income, liquidity constraints, child and adult dependents, liquid
and illiquid assets, revolving credit and retirement. Under parametric assumptions on the model,
the model is identiﬁed from matching the model’s predictions of retirement wealth accumula-
tion, credit card borrowing and consumption-income co-movement with those observed in the
data. Their benchmark estimates imply a 48.5% short-term annualized discount rate and a 4.3%
long-term annualized discount rate. Paserman (2008) estimates the structural parameters of a job
search model with hyperbolic discounting and endogenous search effort, using data on duration
of unemployment spells and accepted wages from the NLSY 1979. Under parametric assumptions
of the model, identiﬁcation of the hyperbolic discounting parameters comes from the variation in
the relative magnitude of unemployment duration and accepted wages. Indeed he ﬁnds that the
results are sensitive to the speciﬁc structure of the model and on the functional form assumption
for the distribution of offered wages. For low-wage workers, he rejects the exponential discount-
ing model and estimates a one-year discount rate of about 149%.5 Chung, Steenburgh and Sudhir
(2009) estimated a dynamic structural model of sales force response to a bonus-based compensa-
tion plan where the salesman might have hyperbolic discounting time preferences. Exploiting the
bonus-based compensation structure, they found some evidence consistent with present bias.
None of the above papers allow for the possibility that a hyperbolic discounting decision-
maker may also be naive. More importantly, the identiﬁcation of the present bias and standard
discount factors inthese papers are often basedon parametric assumptions imposedon the model.
To the best of our knowledge, it is not known whether dynamic discrete choice models with hy-
perbolic discounting preferences can be semi-parametrically identiﬁed using standard short-panel
that a forward-looking model ﬁts the data (mainly the age proﬁle for heavy-drinking and smoking) better than a my-
opic model. Their model assumes exponential discounting and thus does not incorporate the possibility that time
inconsistent preferences may play a role in the consumption of alcohol and cigarettes.
5There are other inferential studies about discount rates that exploit speciﬁc clear-cut intertemporal trade-offs. For
example, Hausman (1979), and Warner and Pleeter (2001) estimate discount rates ranging from 0 to 89% depending on
the characteristics of the individual and intertemporal trade-offs at stake.
2data that are typically used in these papers.6; 7
In this paper, we consider a standard dynamic discrete choice model where decision makers
potentially exhibit hyperbolic discounting preferences in the form of a present-bias factor (), an
exponential discounting factor () and a potential naivety parameter (~ ) [as in O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999a)], and examine the conditions under which the primitive parameters of the model,
including the three hyperbolic discounting time preference parameters, can be identiﬁed using
short-panel (two periods) data. We show that, if there exist exclusion variables that affect the tran-
sition probabilities of states over time but do not affect the decision-makers’ static payoff func-
tions, a condition similar to that in Magnac and Thesmar (2002) necessary for the identiﬁcation
of dynamic discrete choice models with standard exponential discounting, then we can potentially
identify all three discount factors ; ~  and :
The intuition for why exclusion variables that affect the transition of state variables but not
static payoffs might provide source of identiﬁcation for the discount factors can be described as
follows. Consider two decision-makers who share the same period-payoff relevant state variables
but differ only in the exclusion variables. Because the exclusion variables only affect the transition
of the payoff-relevant state variables, their effects on the choices in the current period will inform
us about the degree to which the agents discount the future. The intuition for why ; ~  and  can
be separately identiﬁed will be provided later in Section 3.2.
We propose two estimation approaches that are intimately related to our identiﬁcation argu-
ments. One approach is based on maximizing a pseudo-likelihood function and the other is based
on minimizing the estimated variation of the static payoff functions with respect to the exclusion
variables. Monte Carlo experiments show that both estimators perform well in large samples, but
in relatively small samples, the maximum pseudo-likelihood based estimator performs better. We
thus use maximum pseudo-likelihood based estimator in our empirical application.
Our paper also represents an interesting intermediate case between the literature on estimating
dynamic discrete choice single-agent decision problems [see Miller (1984), Wolpin (1984), Pakes
(1986), Rust (1987), Hotz and Miller (1993) for early contributions and Rust (1994a, 1994b) and
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007b) for surveys] and the more recent literature on estimating dy-
namic games [see Pakes and McGuire (1994), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003), Pakes,
Ostrovsky and Berry (2007), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007a), Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007),
among others; and see Bajari, Hong and Nekipelov (2010) for a survey]. As is well-known, if an
agent has hyperbolic discounting time preferences, the outcome of her decision process can be
6Fang and Silverman (2006) is an exception. They argue that exponential discounting and hyperbolic discounting
models are distinguishable, using an argument based on observed choice probabilities.
7Mahajan and Tarozzi (2010) discuss how data about expectations regarding future behavior might be used to iden-
tify and estimate hyperbolic discounting parameters in their study of the adoption of insecticide treated nets.
3considered as the equilibrium outcome of an intra-personal game with the players being the selves
of the same individual at different periods. There are two crucial differences, however, between the
intra-personal games we analyze for agents with time-inconsistent time preferences and those in
the existing dynamic games literature. The ﬁrst difference is that in the intra-personal game case,
we do not observe the actions of all the players. More speciﬁcally, the outcomes – choices and the
evolutions of the state variables – we observe in the data are affected only by the current selves,
even though the current selves’ choices are impacted by their perception of future selves’ actions.
Secondly, the dynamic games literature [e.g. Bajari, Benkard and Levin 2007] may allow for the
different players to have different period-payoff functions, however, in our setting the payoffs
for the players – the current self and the future selves – differ only in time preferences; more-
over, under hyperbolic discounting, we are assuming a rather restricted form of time preference
differences between the players.
We illustrate our identiﬁcation argument and estimation method with an empirical applica-
tion of adult women’s decisions to undertake mammography to investigate the role of time incon-
sistent preferences in the under-utilization of this preventive care. We consider a simple model
where mammography can potentially lower the probability of death in the next two years and it
may also lower the probability of bad health conditional on surviving in two years; however, un-
dertaking mammography may involve immediate costs (most of which we would like to interpret
as psychological and physical costs instead of ﬁnancial costs). For the purpose of identifying the
hyperbolic discounting preference parameters, we use several variables, including the indicator
for either the woman’s mother is still alive and/or whether she died at age greater than 70, as
the exclusion variables that do not enter the relevant instantaneous payoff function but affects the
transition probability of other instantaneous payoff-relevant state variables. Our estimates indi-
cate that individuals exhibit both present bias and naivety as  and ~  are estimated to be about
0:72 and 0:99, respectively, suggesting both present bias ( < 1) and naivety (~  > ). These sug-
gest that both present bias and naivety might have played an important role in the fact that nearly
25% of the women do not undertake mammography as advised by American Cancer Association,
which is universally regarded as a very cost effective way for early detection of breast cancer (see
Degnan et al. 1992).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe a general dy-
namic discrete choice model with hyperbolic discounting time preferences. In Section 3 we pro-
vide detailed analysis for identiﬁcation. In Section 4, we propose two estimation strategies based
on the identiﬁcation arguments for the discount factors and we also evaluate the performance of
our proposed estimation methods using Monte Carlo experiments. In Section 5 we provide the
background information for mammography, which is the decision we examine in our empirical
4application; we also describe the data set used in our study and provide some basic descriptive
statistics of the samples; we then provide details about the empirical speciﬁcation of our model
of the decision for undertaking mammography and present the main estimation results. Finally,
Section 6 concludes and discusses a few important issues abstracted away in our analysis. In the
Appendix, we provide additional details about how our identiﬁcation argument can be extended
to ﬁnite horizon applications.
2 Dynamic Discrete Choice Model with Hyperbolic Discounting Time
Preferences
2.1 Basic Model Setup
Consideradecisionmakerwhoseintertemporalutilityisadditivelytimeseparable. Theagent’s
instantaneous preferences are deﬁned over the action she chooses from a discrete set of alterna-
tives i 2 I = f0;1;:::;Ig; and a list of state variables denoted by h  (x;") where x 2 X, which
for notational simplicity includes time t; are observed by the researcher, and "  ("1;:::;"I) 2 RI
are the vector of random preference shocks for each of the I alternatives.8 We make the following
assumption about the instant utility from taking action i, u
i (h)  u
i (x;"):
Assumption 1. (Additive Separability) The instantaneous utilities are given by, for each i 2 I;
u
i (x;") = ui (x) + "i; (1)
where ui (x) is the deterministic component of the utility from choosing i at x; and ("1;:::;"I) has a joint
distribution G; which is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure in RI:
We assume that the time horizon is inﬁnite with time denoted by t = 1;2;::: The decision-
maker’s intertemporal preferences are represented by a simple and now commonly used formu-
lation of agents’ potentially time-inconsistent preferences: (;)-preferences (Phelps and Pollak,
1968; Laibson, 1997; and O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999a):
Deﬁnition 1. (;)-preferences are intertemporal preferences represented by




where  2 (0;1] and  2 (0;1]:
8We assume that X is a ﬁnite set and denote X = #X to be the size of the state space.
5Following the terminology of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a), the parameter  is called the
standard discount factor, which captures long-run, time-consistent discounting; and the parameter
 is called the present-bias factor, which captures short-term impatience. The standard model is
nested as a special case of (;)-preferences when  = 1: When  2 (0;1); (;)-preferences
capture “quasi-hyperbolic” time discounting (Laibson, 1997). We say that an agent’s preferences
are time-consistent if  = 1; and are present-biased if  2 (0;1).
The literature on time-inconsistent preferences distinguishes between naive and sophisticated
agents (Strotz, 1956; Pollak, 1968; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a, 1999b). An agent is partially
naive if the self in every period t underestimates the present-bias of her future selves, believing
that her future selves’ present bias is ~  2 (;1); in the extreme, if the present self believes that her
future selves are time-consistent, i.e. ~  = 1, she is said to be completely naive. On the other hand,
an agent is sophisticated if the self in every period t correctly knows her future selves’ present-bias
 and anticipates their behavior when making her period-t decision, i.e., if ~  = :
Following previous studies of time-inconsistent preferences, we will analyze the behavior of
an agent by thinking of the single individual as consisting of many autonomous selves, one for
each period. Each period-t self chooses her current behavior to maximize her current utility
Ut (ut;ut+1;:::); while her future selves control her subsequent decisions.
More speciﬁcally, let the observable state variable in period t be xt 2 X where X denotes
the support of the state variables and the unobservable choice-speciﬁc shock "it 2 R; and "t =
("1t;:::;"It) 2 RI: A strategy proﬁle for all selves is   ftg
1
t=1 where t : X  RI ! I for all t: It
speciﬁes for each self her action in all possible states and under all possible realizations of shock
vectors. For any strategy proﬁle ; write +
t  fkg
1
k=t as the continuation strategy proﬁle from
period t on:
To deﬁne and characterize the equilibrium of the intra-personal game of an agent with poten-





as the agent’s period-t expected
continuation utility when the state variable is xt and the shock vector is "t under her long-run
time preference for a given continuation strategy proﬁle +






resenting (hypothetically) her intertemporal preferences from some prior perspective when her


























where t (xt;"t) 2 I is the choice speciﬁed by strategy t; and the expectation is taken over both
the future state xt+1 and "t+1:
We will deﬁne the equilibrium for a partially naive agent whose period-t self believes that,
6beginning next period, her future selves will behave optimally with a present-bias factor of ~  2
[;1]. Following O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b, 2001), we ﬁrst deﬁne the concept of an agent’s
perceived continuation strategy proﬁle by her future selves.
Deﬁnition 2. The perceived continuation strategy proﬁle for a partially naive agent is a strategy proﬁle
~  f~ tg
1
t=1 such that for all t = 1;2;:::, all xt 2 X; and all "t 2 RI;














That is, if an agent is partially naive with perceived present-bias by future selves at ~ ; then her
period-t self will anticipate that her future selves will follow strategies ~ +
t+1  f~ kg
1
k=t+1 : Note,
importantly, what the strategy proﬁle ~  f~ tg
1
t=1 describes is the perception of the partially naive
agent regarding what her future selves will play. It is not what will generate the actual play that we
observe in the data. What we actually observe is generated from the perception-perfect strategy
proﬁle that we now deﬁne.




t=1 such that, for all t = 1;2;:::, all xt 2 X; and all "t 2 RI;















Thatis,  isthe bestresponseofthe currentselfwith(;)-preferenceagainst ~ ; theperceived
continuation strategy proﬁle of her future selves. It is key to note the difference and connection
between ~  and : ~  is the unobserved perception of the partially naive agent regarding what her
future selves will do, under the partial naivety assumption that her future selves do not suffer
from the present bias as described by the parameter ; but instead is governed by present bias
parameter ~  that may differ from :  is what the self in each period will optimally choose to do,
and the actions generated from  are what will be observed in the data. Note also that when 
and ~  coincide, i.e., when the agent is sophisticated, we have  = ~ :
Assumption 2. (Stationarity) We assume that the observed choices are generated under the stationary
perception-perfect strategy proﬁle of the inﬁnite horizon dynamic game played among different selves of the
decision makers.
72.2 Decision Process
Now we describe the decision process of the decision maker. First, deﬁne the deterministic
component of the current choice-speciﬁc value function, Wi (x), as follows:




where (x0jx;i) denotes the transition probabilities for state variables x when action i is taken;
and V () is the perceived long-run value function deﬁned as:
V (x)  E"V (x;"; ~ ) (4)
where V (x;"; ~ ) is the stationary value function deﬁned according to (2) under the perceived
continuation strategy proﬁle ~  for a partially naive agent as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2.
Using V () as deﬁned in (4), we can also deﬁne the choice-speciﬁc value function of the next-period
self as perceived by the current self, Zi (x); as follows:




There are two key difference between Wi (x) and Zi (x). The ﬁrst difference is in how they
discount the future streams of payoffs: in Wi (x) the payoff t periods removed from the current
period is discounted by t; while in Zi (x) the payoff t periods removed from now is discounted
by ~ t: The second difference is interpretational: Wi (x) represents how the current-period self
evaluates the deterministic component of the payoff from choosing alternative i; while Zi (x) is
how the current-period self perceives how her next-period self would evaluate the deterministic
componentofthepayofffromchoosingalternativei: ItisobviousbutimportanttonotethatWi (x)
will regulate the current self’s optimal choice, but Zi (x) will regulate the perception of the current
self regarding the choices of her future selves.
Given Zi (x); we know that the current self’s perception of her future self’s choice, i.e., ~  as
deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2 is simply
~  (x;") = max
i2I
"







[Zi (x) + "i]: (6)
Let us deﬁne the probability of choosing alternative j by the the next period self as perceived by
8the current period self, ~ Pj (x); when the next-period’s state is x :
~ Pj (x) = Pr[~  (x;") = j] (7)
= Pr

Zj (x) + "j  Zj0 + "j0 for all j0 6= j

:
With the characterization of ~  (x;"), we can now provide a characterization of V (): For this
purpose, further denote the perceived choice-speciﬁc long-run value function Vi (x) as follows:




According to the deﬁnition of V () as given by (4), V (x) is simply the expected value of Vi (x)+"i,
where i is the chosen alternative according to ~  (x;"); that is, we have the following relationship:
V (x) = E"

V~ (x;") (x) + "~ (x;")

: (9)
Now note from (5) and (8), we have
Vi (x) = Zi (x) +







Relationship (10) is crucial as it allows us to rewrite (9) as:
V (x) = E"





Z~ (x;") (x) + "~ (x;") +










[Zi (x) + "i] +






V (x0)(x0jx; ~  (x;"))
= E"max
i2I
[Zi (x) + "i] +













where the second equality just follows from (10); and the third equality follows from (6) and thus
E"





[Zi (x) + "i];























Now we make two additional standard assumptions about the transition of the state variables
and the distribution of the shocks [see, e.g., Rust (1994b)]:
Assumption 3. (Conditional Independence):
(xt+1;"t+1jxt;"t;dt) = q("t+1jxt+1)(xt+1jxt;dt)
q("t+1jxt+1) = q("):
Assumption 4. (Extreme Value Distribution): "t is i.i.d extreme value distributed.
Remark 1. It is well-known that the distribution of the choice-speciﬁc shocks to payoffs in discrete choice
models are not non-parametrically identiﬁed (see Magnac and Thesmar 2002, for example). Thus one has
to make an assumption about the distribution of ": We make the extreme value distribution assumption for
simplicity, but it could be replaced by any other distribution G .
With the above preliminary notations, now we can describe how the agent will make the
choices when the state variables are given by (x;"): From Deﬁnition 3 for perception perfect strat-




fWi (x) + "ig:
That is, the perception-perfect strategy proﬁle  (x;") is:
 (x;") = argmax
i2I
fWi (x) + "ig:
Under Assumption 4, the probability of observing action i being chosen at a given state variable x
is:
Pi (x) = Pr

Wi (x) + "i > max
j2Infig







Pi (x) is the current-period self’s equilibrium choice probabilities and will be observed in the data.
Now we derive some important relationships that will be used in our identiﬁcation exercise
10below. First, note that by combining (3) and (5), we have that:
Zi (x)   ui (x) =
~ 

[Wi (x)   ui (x)]: (13)
Since both Zi () and Wi () depends on V (); we would like to use (11) to derive a characteri-
zation of V (): Note that under Assumptions 4, we have:
E"max
i2I







Moreover, from (7), we have that





Using (14) and (15), we can rewrite (11) as



















The three set of equations (5), (13) and (16) will form the basis of our identiﬁcation argument
below. Let us ﬁrst make a few useful remarks.
Remark 2. We have three value functions fWi (x);Zi (x);Vi (x) : x 2 Xg as deﬁned respectively in (3),
(5) and (8). Both Wi () and Zi () are related to Vi (): It is worth emphasizing that Wi (x) will regulate the
current self’s choice behavior as demonstrated by (12); and Zi (x) will regulate the current self’s perception
of future selves choices as demonstrated by (15). Vi (x) is an auxiliary value function that simply uses the
long-run discount factor  to evaluate the payoffs from the choices that the current self perceives that will be
made by her future selves.
Remark 3. If ~  = 1; i.e., if the decision maker is completely naive, we can see from (10) that Vi (x) = Zi (x)
for all x: This makes sense because when ~  = 1; the current self perceives her future selves to be time
consistent. Thus the current self is already perceiving her future selves to be behaving according to the long
run discount factor  only.
Remark 4. If ~  = ; i.e., when an agent is sophisticated, then Eqs. (3) and (5) tell us that Wi (x) = Zi (x):
That is, if the decision maker is sophisticated, then the current self’s own choice rule will be identical to what
she perceives to be her future self’s choice rule.
Remark 5. When the decision maker is partially naive, there are two distinct value functions Wi (x) and
Zi (x) that separately regulate the choice of the current self and the perceived choice of her future selves.
11Notation Interpretation Equation/Deﬁnition
ui (x)
Deterministic payoff from choosing alternative i
when state vector is x
u
i (x)
Payoff, including the choice-speciﬁc shock, from choosing
alternative iwhen state vector is x : u
i (x) ui (x)+"i
Eq. (1)
 The present-bias factor Deﬁnition (1)
~  The partial naivety parameter: ~  2 [;1]
 The standard discount factor Deﬁnition (1)
Vi (x) Perceived choice-speciﬁc long-run value function Eq. (8)
V (x) Perceived long-run value function Eq. (4)
Wi (x) Current choice-speciﬁc value function Eq. (3)
Zi (x)
Choice-speciﬁc value function of the next-period self
as perceived by the current self
Eq. (5)
~  (x;") Perceived continuation strategy proﬁle for a partially naive agent Deﬁnition (2)
 (x;") Perception-perfect strategy proﬁle for a partially naive agent Deﬁnition (3)
Table 1: Summary of Key Notations.
Equation (13) clariﬁes that it is the fact that we allow for potential naivety in the hyperbolic model that is
creating the wedge between Wi (x) and Zi (x) : if ~  = ; i.e., if agents are sophisticated (even when they
suffer from present bias), it would be true that Wi (x) = Zi (x): This is an important point because, as
we see in (12), the observed choice probabilities (our data) would provide direct information about Wi (x),
without needing any information about the discount factors. Thus when ~  = ; the observed choice proba-
bilities also provide direct information about Zi (x); but when ~  and  are potentially not equal, we can no
longer learn about Zi (x) directly from the observed choice probabilities.
Summary. Table 1 summarizes the main notations we have introduced up to now.
2.3 Relationship with the Dynamic Games Literature
We analyze the observed outcome of the dynamic discrete choice problem of a hyperbolic dis-
counting decision process as the equilibrium outcome of an intra-personal game with the players
being the selves at different periods. Thus our paper represents an interesting intermediate case be-
tween the classic literature on estimating single-agent dynamic discrete choice decision problems
and the more recent literature on estimating dynamic games. It is worth pointing out that there
are two crucial differences between the intra-personal games we analyze for agents with time-
12inconsistent time preferences and those in the existing dynamic games literature.
The ﬁrst key difference is that in our case, we do not observe the actions of all the players. More
speciﬁcally, the outcomes – choices and the evolutions of the state variables – we observe in the
data are affected only by the current selves, even though the current selves’ choices are impacted
by their perception of future selves’ actions. The current self’s perception of how her future selves
will play has to be inferred by the researcher using the equilibrium restriction imposed by the
theory. As can be seen from the above discussion, ~ Pj (x) as deﬁned in (15), captures the current
self’s perception of how her future selves will play, which is crucial for us to understand the
current self’s actual choices. However, as a researcher, we do not observe ~ Pj; only observe Pj;
the choice probabilities by the current self. In the standard dynamic games literature, it is always
assumed that the action of all the players are observed.
Secondly, the dynamic games literature (e.g. Bajari, Benkard and Levin 2007) may allow for
players to have different contemporaneous payoff functions, in our setting, however, the payoffs
for the players – the current self and the future selves – differ only in their time preferences;
moreover, under hyperbolic discounting, we are assuming a rather restricted form of difference in
time preferences between the selves in different periods.
3 Identiﬁcation
3.1 Data and Preliminaries
Before we describe our results on identiﬁcation, let us assume that we have access to a data set
that provides us with the following information:
DATA:
 (Conditional Choice Probabilities) For all x 2 X; we observe the choice probabilities Pi (x)
for all i 2 I;
 (Transitional Probabilities for Observable State Variables) For all (x;x0) 2 X 2; all i 2 I;










2 X 2;i 2 I
	
;
 (Short Panels) We have access to at least two periods of the above data, even though the
data results from a stationary inﬁnite horizon model.
13Following Magnac and Thesmar (2002), we assume that the structure of the model, denoted by














: i 2 I;x 2 X;x0 2 X
	o
;
where G(); the distribution of the choice-speciﬁc payoff shocks "it; is assumed to have a Type-I
extreme value distribution by Assumption 4. Note that the elements in  in our setting differs
from those in Magnac and Thesmar (2002) in that we have two additional parameters  and ~  that
measure present bias and naivety; moreover, the interpretation of Vi (x0) in our paper differs from
theirs. In their paper Vi (x0) directly informs about the actual choice probabilities of the decision
maker in the second period because Pr(ijx0) = Pr(Vi (x0) + "i > Vj (x0) + "j 8j 6= i): In our paper,
Zi (x0) captures the current self’s perception of the choice probability of the next period’s self, which
is never actually observed in the data; while Vi (x0) is just an auxiliary value function to account
for the exponentially discounted payoff streams from the perceived choices made according to
~  (x;"): Another difference is that in Magnac and Thesmar (2002), the vector fVi (x0) : x0 2 Xg are
completely free parameters; in our setting, however, neither Zi (x0) and Vi (x0) are completely free
parameters as they are subject to the restriction that they have to satisfy (5), (13) and (16).
We denote by  the set of all permissible structures. The set  requires that the structure
satisﬁes the assumptions we adopted in the model, as well as the restrictions (5), (13) and (16).
Given any structure  2 ; the model predicts the probability that an agent will choose alter-
native i 2 I in state x 2 X; which we denote by ^ Pi (x;) and is given by
^ Pi (x;) = Pr
(
ui(x) + "i + 
X
x02X
V (x0)(x0jx;i) = max
j2I
"










As is standard in the identiﬁcation literature, we call the predicted choice probabilities ^ Pi (x;) as
the reduced form of structure  2 : We say that two structures ;0 2  are observationally equivalent
if
^ Pi (x;) = ^ Pi
 
x;0
8i 2 I and x 2 X:
A model is said to be identiﬁed if and only if for any ;0 2 ;  = 0 if they are observationally
equivalent.
9We could have included the vector fWi (x): i 2 I;x 2 Xg as part of the model parameters as well. But as seen from
Eq. (17), Wi (x) can be straightforwardly inferred from the data of choice probabilities Pi (x), subject to a normalization.
For this reason, we exclude them from our list of model parameters.
143.2 Identiﬁcation Results
Weﬁrstdescribeidentiﬁcationofhfui (x);Zi (x0);Vi (x0) : i 2 I;x 2 X;x0 2 Xgiwithforagiven













For any given joint distribution G of ~ "  ("1;:::;"I); the choice probability vector P(x) =
(P1 (x);:::;PI (x)) is a mapping Q of W(x) = (W0 (x);W1 (x);:::;WI (x)): Hotz and Miller (1993)
showed that the mapping Q can be inverted if for each i 2 I; one of the Wi (x) is normalized. That
is, one can ﬁnd
Di (x)  Wi (x)   W0 (x) = Qi (P(x);G)
where Qi is the ith component of the inverse Q: Under our Assumption 4 (that "i has i.i.d Type-I
Extreme Value distribution), the mapping Qi is especially simple [following from (12)]:




Since we observe Pi (x) and P0 (x) from the data, we immediately learn about Di (x): We thus
proceed as if Di (x) is observable.











Together with (17), we have, for all i 2 Inf0g and x 2 X;









[ui (x)   u0 (x)]: (19)
Now let us examine the system of equations deﬁned by Eq. (16), which can be re-written, using
(15), as, for all x 2 X;

















Note that if we take
n
; ~ ;;hZi (x) : x 2 Xi
o
as given, Eq. (20) is just a system of X linear equa-
15tion in X unknowns, namely, V [V (1);:::;V (X)]
T :10
Speciﬁcally, if we stack

Z0 (x) + ln
P
i2I exp[Zi (x)   Z0 (x)]
	
x2X into an X1 column vec-
tor A, denote by ~ P 

~ P0  ~ PI

the X  [(I + 1)X] matrix of choice probabilities,11 and
















we can write (20) as
V=A+

1   ~ 

~ PV;
which yields the solution of V as a function of
n
















; we can plug (21) into (5) and obtain, for all x 2 X; and all
i 2 I  f0;1;:::;Ig;










= ui (x) + ~ i (x)V (22)









where i (x) = [ (1jx;i);:::; (Xjx;i)] is an X  1 vector as deﬁned in footnote 12.
10Note that all the terms ~ Pj (x) just depend on Zi ():








~ Pj (0) 0  0
0 ~ Pj (1)  0
0 0
... 0


































 (1j1;j) :::  (Xj1;j)
 (1j2;j) :::  (Xj2;j)
. . .








16Now consider the system of equations given by (19) and (22). We know from the standard
theories of discrete choice that we have to normalize the utility for the reference alternative 0;
which without loss of generality we set u0 (x) = 0 for all x 2 X: Thus, the unknowns contained
in the equation system of (19) and (22) include the following unknowns: (I + 1)  X values for
fZi (x) : i 2 I;x 2 Xg and I  X values for fui (x) : i 2 I=f0g;x 2 Xg: That is, the total number
of unknowns is (2I + 1)X: It is also easy to see that the total number of equations in the system
is also equal to (2I + 1)  X : I  X equations in (19) and (I + 1)  X equations in (22).
Of course, having the same number of equations as the number of unknowns does not guaran-
tee the existence, or the uniqueness of the solutions. We will describe how the number of solutions
affect our estimation procedure below.




appear in three different combinations: ﬁrst, in Eqs. (22), both ~  and

1   ~ 

 appear; second,
~ = appears in Eqs. (19): The fact that ~ ;

1   ~ 

 and ~ = appear in the equation system is




parameters.13 It is important to emphasize




enter our problem is not by ad hoc
assumptions, instead they are driven by theoretical considerations.
Finally, as we will see below, the main variables of interest that we would like to solve in
the equation system (19) and (22) are the I  X values for fui (x) : i 2 I=f0g;x 2 Xg; and the
values for fZi (x) : i 2 I;x 2 Xg are only auxiliary. In our actual estimation, we indeed fur-
ther eliminate fZi (x) : i 2 I;x 2 Xg from the equation system (19) and (22) and only solve for
fui (x) : i 2 I=f0g;x 2 Xg:








: This discussion is closely
related to that in Magnac and Thesmar (2002). We impose the following exclusion restriction as-
sumption:
Assumption 5. (exclusion Restriction) There exist state variable x1 2 X and x2 2 X with x1 6= x2;
such that
1. for all i 2 I; ui (x1) = ui (x2);













 = ~  +

1   ~ 




















172. for some i 2 I;  (x0jx1;i) 6=  (x0jx2;i):
More speciﬁcally, to satisfy the exclusion restriction assumption, there must exist at least one
variable that does not directly affect the contemporaneous utility function ui () for all i 2 I; but
the variable may matter for choices because it affects the transition of state variables. The extent
to which individuals’ choice probabilities differ at state x1 and x2 reveals information about the
discount factors. This is the key intuition from Magnac and Thesmar’s (2002) result where they
are interested in identifying a single long-term discount factor : In their setting, if  = 0; i.e., if
individuals are completely myopic, then the choice probabilities would have been the same under
x1 and x2; to the extent that choice probabilities differ at x1 and x2; it reveals information about
the degree of time discounting. Their intuition, however, can be easily extended to the hyperbolic
discounting case, as we will exploit in the proposed estimation strategy below.
For notational simplicity, we will divide the state variables into two groups (xr;xe) where
xr 2 Xr refers to the state variables that directly enter the contemporaneous payoff function ui (xr)
and xe 2 Xe refers to the state variables that satisfy the exclusion restriction (5). The key idea that
the existence of exclusion variables can provide the source of identiﬁcation of the discount factors




, Section 3.2.1 tells us that we can identify, from the





with the data at all. However, consider two state vectors x = (xr;xe) and x0 = (xr;x0
e) that only





with the true values, there is no guarantee that the identiﬁed values of ui (x) and ui (x0) are equal,





such that the values of ui (x) and ui (x0) identiﬁed from the data only differ if x and x0
differ in components of xr:










the observed choice behavior by the current self differently.
Distinguishing  and : It may seem counterintuitive that  and  could be separately identiﬁed
in a short two-period panel data set. To provide some intuition, let us consider the case that ~  = .
The question is: “Can we distinguish the behavior of an agent with exponential discounting rate
^  =  from the behavior of a sophisticated time-inconsistent agent with preference (;)?” Under
stationarity assumption, if an agent has time consistent exponential discounting rate ^  = , her
expected continuation utilities is completely determined by the observed choice probabilities. To
18see this, observe that in equation (20), if one replaces ~  by 1 and  by ^ ; we will have




exp[Zi (x)   Z0 (x)]
)
;
which only depends on Di (x) when  = ~ :
However, for a sophisticated time-inconsistent agent with preference (;); there is an incon-
gruence between current self and her perceived future self regarding how they evaluate the future
stream of payoffs. Though the current self has to defer to her next-period self in terms of the ac-
tual next-period choice that will be chosen, they disagree on how much weight to put on payoffs
two-periods from now. It is this incongruence that leads to the last term in Eq. (20), which in turn
breaks the tight link between observed choice probabilities and the continuation utilities.
As we demonstrated in Section 3.2.1, the continuation utilities will ultimately determine the
identiﬁed values of hfui (x) : i 2 I;x 2 Xgi: Thus  and  can be distinguished when there are
exclusion variables because they requires that ui (x) does not depend on the xe components of the
state vector.
Distinguishing  and ~ : To help provide intuition for why  could be distinguished from ~ ; let
us suppose that  = 1: First note that the ratio ~ = appears in term Zi (x) [see Eq. (18)]. This
ratio regulates the incongruence between the current self’s own behavior and her perception of
the behavior of her future selves. Eq. (19) shows that if ~ = = 1; then Zi (x)   Z0 (x) is uniquely
determined by the observed Di (x); and thus the current self’s perception about her future self’s
action is identical to her own action. This implies that ~ = = 1 (and  = 1) will pin down com-
pletely the identiﬁed values of hfui (x) : i 2 I;x 2 Xgi from the data, which could be refuted if the
identiﬁed values of ui (x) do not satisfy the exclusion restrictions, i.e., ui (x) should not depend on
the xe components of the state vector.
3.3 The Exponential Discounting Special Case:  = ~  = 1
Before discussing our estimation strategy, we here show that the non-linear equation system
(19) and (22), for the special case of dynamic discrete choice models with exponential discounting
(i.e., the case with ~  =  = 1), replicates the known results in the literature. In that case, (19) is
reduced to the well-known relationship
Zi (x)   Z0 (x) = lnPi (x)   lnP0 (x); (23)
19that is, in standard models the difference in the choice probabilities for alternative i and the refer-
ence alternative 0 informs us about the difference in the value from choosing i relative to the value
from choosing 0: This is of course also true when ~  =  < 1: The potential naivety we allow in
our setup breaks this direct relationship between Pi (x)=P0 (x) and Zi (x)   Z0 (x):
Moreover, when ~  =  = 1; (22) for i = 0 is reduced to (using the normalization that u0 (x) =
0) :

























For simplicity, denote the X 1 vector fZ0 (x)gx2X as Z0; write the X X matrix  (x0jx;0) as 0;









as m: The above equation can be written as




Given this unique solution of Z0; (23) immediately provides Zi (x) for all i 2 I=f0g and all x 2 X:
To obtain ui (x) for i 2 Inf0g, note that (22) implies that
ui = Zi   iZ0   im; (24)
where Zi and ui are X  1 vectors of fZi (x)gx2X and fui (x)gx2X respectively, i is the X  X
matrix  (x0jx;i): Recall that in the standard exponential discounting model we have Zi (x) =
Vi (x); thus we can conclude that , fuigi2Inf0g and fVigi2I are identiﬁed once ;G and fu0 (x)gx2X
are ﬁxed. This replicates the proof of Proposition 2 in Magnac and Thesmar (2002).14
4 Estimation Strategies
In this section, we describe two estimation strategies based on our discussion about identiﬁca-
tion above. Both estimation strategy involves two steps, and they share the same ﬁrst step. In the
ﬁrst step, we estimate from the data the choice probabilities Pi (x) for all i 2 I and all x 2 X; as
well as the state transition probabilities  (x0jx;i) for all i 2 I and all (x0;x) 2 X 2:15
14The only difference is that our argument above indicates that V0 does not have to be ﬁxed. It can be identiﬁed from
the model.
15It is useful to note that so far, our discussion has focused on short-panel (two period) data sets under stationarity
assumption. Having two-period data allows one to non-parametrically estimate the transition probabilities  (x
0jx;i);
stationarity ensures that looking at a two-period slice of a potentially long panel is sufﬁcient. Fang and Silverman (2006)
considered a case without stationarity (speciﬁcally a ﬁnite horizon model) and showed that  and  could be poten-
20The second step is different for the two estimation strategies. The ﬁrst estimation strategy in-
volves two loops. In the inner loop, we solve equation system (19) and (22) for ui (x) = ui (xr;xe)




for all i 2 Inf0g and all x 2 X where we normalize
u0 (x) = 0 for all x 2 X: In the outer loop, we exploit the identifying assumption 5 in a straightfor-




, for all ~ xe 2 Xe, the standard deviation
of ^ ui (xr; ~ xe) with respect to ~ xe should be 0, because Assumption 5 requires that ui(xr; ~ xe) does not
































is simply the sample standard deviation of ^ ui (xr; ~ xe); calculated




; with respect to ~ xe:
The second estimation strategy is a maximum pseudo-likelihood estimation. As in the ﬁrst
estimation strategy, we ﬁrst solve equation system (19) and (22) for ui (x) = ui (xr;xe) for a given




for all i 2 Inf0g and all x 2 X where we normalize u0 (x) = 0 for all
x 2 X: Then we directly impose, by Assumption 5, the restriction that
^ ui (xr) =
1
jf(xr; ~ xe) : ~ xe 2 Xegj
X
f(xr;~ xe):~ xe2Xeg
^ ui (xr; ~ xe) (26)
where Xe is the set of possible values for the payoff irrelevant state variables xe we discussed in
Assumption 5. Given ^ ui (xr) as deﬁned by (26), we can then use the model to predict the implied






; and formulate the pseudo-likelihood of the observed data,















where in the likelihood function, n stands for an individual and N stands for the set of individ-
uals in the sample, and also note that we partialed out the contribution from the state transitions
 (x0jx;i) in the likelihood since it is already estimated in step one. We then maximize the pseudo-





tially distinguished without exclusion restriction if the researcher has access to at least three-period panel data. Also,
see Section 6 for discussions related to non-stationariy, longer panels and unobserved state variables or unobserved
heterogeity.
214.1 Discussions
Now we discuss a few practical issues that may arise in the estimation.
Solutions to the Equation System (19) and (22). Even though the equation system (19) and (22)
have the same number of equations and unknowns, there is no guarantee that the system will have




:16 In practice, we deal with the potential



















 in (25) for estimation method 1 to +1 (i.e., a sufﬁciently
large value), and the objective likelihood in (27) for estimation method 2 to  1 (i.e., a sufﬁciently




; we ﬁnd multi-
ple solutions to the equation system, we will, among all the solutions, pick the smallest values of
the objective (25) for estimation method 1 and pick the highest likelihood in (27) for estimation
method 2.
Size of the Support of exclusion Restriction State Variables Xe: As we described in Section 3.2,
the identiﬁcation of the model comes from the presence of state variables that satisfy the exclusion




by requiring that only those combinations
ofthediscountfactorsthatcanexplaintheobserveddatawithpayoffshfui (x) : i 2 Inf0g;x 2 Xgi
that do not vary with respect to changes in xe: Since we have three unknown discount factors D
; ~ ;
E
; we need at least three cross-xe restrictions, i.e., a minimum of four different points in the
support Xe are required. Also, the requirement for the size of the support Xe seems to differ be-
tween the two proposed estimation methods. In estimation method 1, the larger the size of Xe, the


















The effect of the size of Xe on the properties of the objective function in (27) is less pronounced.
ParametricUtilityFunctionSpeciﬁcations. Eventhoughwedescribedhowhfui (x) : i 2 Inf0g;x 2 Xgi





In practice, we may often parameterize it as a function of observed state variables x; including the
exclusion variables xe: In such cases, the estimation methods described above can be adapted to
minimize the standard deviation of the coefﬁcient estimates for the exclusion variables xe for es-
timation method 1. Estimation method 2, though, still goes through unmodiﬁed (see Footnote 18
for an illustration in our Monte Carlo experiments).
16As we show in Section 3.3, the system does have a unique solution under the exponential discounting case, i.e.,
when ~  =  = 1; for any  2 (0;1):
224.2 Monte Carlo Experiments
In this section we provide Monte Carlo evidence for the identiﬁcation of discount factors in a
dynamic discrete choice model using the two estimation methods described above. In this simple
Monte Carlo exercise, we consider a binary choice decision problem, i 2 f0;1g; facing an agent
with inﬁnite horizon, stationary state transition, and linear utility functions. There are two state
variables xr and xe. The state variable xr 2 Xr = f0;1;2;3;4;5g, affects both instantaneous utility
and state transition; while state variable xe 2 Xe = f0;1;2;3g, affects only the state transition.17
We parameterize the instantaneous payoff functions ui (xr) as follows: u1 (xr) = 0 + 1xr; and
normalize u0 (xr) = 0 for all xr. The true parameters are set at: 0 =  0:1, 1 = 0:5,  = 0:8,
 = 0:6, and ~  = 0:7.18 For each sample size (240,000, 120,000 and 12,500), we randomly generate
2,000 simulation samples, and estimate the discount factors and corresponding utility parameters
to examine the differences in performance of these two estimation methods.
Table 2 presents the Monte Carlo results. It shows that both estimation methods do a good
job in recovering the true parameter values in large samples. Estimation results improve with in-
creasesinsamplesizes. Becausethesecondestimationstrategy, themaximumpseudo-loglikelihood
method, has only one loop in the second step, it is the method we use in our empirical exercise.






described in Sections 3.2 and 4. We provide estimates of these key time preference pa-
rameters and then examine the role of present bias and naivety in women’s decisions to undertake
mammography.
17The state transition matrices are generated as follows. We ﬁrst generate two random matrices M0 and M1 each with
dimension #Xr  #Xe = 6  4 = 24; with each entry a random number generated from a uniform [0;1] distribution.
We then normalize the entry in each row by its row sum to ensure a proper probability matrix. The resulting matrices
are denoted 0 and 1, the choice-speciﬁc state transition probabilities. The (j;k)-th entry of matrix i where (j;k) 2
f1;:::;24g




e) takes on k-th combination condition on (xr;xe) taking on j-th combination
in this period and action chosen is i 2 f0;1g: The matrices 1 and 0 are assumed to be known by the decision maker;
and are directly taken to be the state transition probabilities in our Monte Carlo exercise reported in Table 2.
18Given the assumed linear utility functions in this Monte Carlo exercise, the objective function for the outer loop of












jj:jj refers to the Euclidean metric.
23Estimation Method Estimation Strategy I Estimation Strategy II
Parameters   ~  0 1   ~  0 1
True Values 0.8 0.6 0.7 -0.1 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.7 -0.1 0.5
Sample Size: 240;000
Mean 0.837 0.633 0.691 -0.098 0.499 0.815 0.588 0.696 -0.100 0.500
Std. Dev. 0.064 0.064 0.069 0.006 0.002 0.045 0.050 0.057 0.007 0.002
Sample Size: 120;000
Mean 0.860 0.632 0.672 -0.096 0.499 0.821 0.584 0.691 -0.099 0.499
Std. Dev. 0.066 0.079 0.079 0.008 0.003 0.053 0.078 0.077 0.009 0.003
Sample Size: 12;500
Mean 0.874 0.603 0.678 -0.095 0.499 0.838 0.553 0.713 -0.098 0.500
Std. Dev. 0.104 0.162 0.119 0.020 0.008 0.107 0.160 0.123 0.020 0.009
Table 2: Monte Carlo Results Under the Two Proposed Estimation Methods.
Notes: For each sample size, we generate 2000 random simulation samples. The Mean and Standard Deviations of the
estimated parameters are with respect to the 2000 samples.
5.1 Background on Mammography
Among American women, breast cancer is the third most common cause of death, and the
second leading cause of cancer death. According to American Cancer Society, from birth to age
39, one woman in 231 will get breast cancer (< 0:5% risk); from age 40-59, the chance is 1 in 25 (4%
risk); from age 60-79, the chance is 1 in 15 (nearly 7%). Assuming that a woman lives to age 90,
the chance of getting breast cancer over the course of an entire lifetime is 1 in 7, with an overall
lifetime risk of 14:3%.19
Breast cancer takes years to develop. Early in the disease, most breast cancers cause no symp-
toms. When breast cancer is detected at a localized stage before it spreads to the lymph nodes),
the 5-year survival rate is 98%. If the cancer has spread to nearby lymph nodes (regional disease),
the rate drops to 81%. If the cancer has spread (metastasized) to distant organs such as the lungs,
bone marrow, liver, or brain, the 5-year survival rate is 26%:
A screening, mammography, is the best tool available to ﬁnd breast cancer before symptoms
appear. Mammography can often detect a breast lump before it can be felt and therefore save
lives by ﬁnding breast cancer as early as possible. For women over the age of 50, mammography
19As a useful comparison, breast cancer has a higher incidence rate than lung cancer in the US. In 2004, there were
217;440 new cases for breast cancer in the U.S. (American Cancer Society).
24have been shown to lower the chance of dying from breast cancer by 35%.20; 21 Leading experts,
the National Cancer Institute, the American Cancer Society, and the American College of Radiol-
ogy recommend annual mammography for women over 40.22 The guideline issued by the U.S.
Preventive Services Task Force in 2002 also recommended mammography screening for women
beginning at age 40 every 12-24 months in order to reduce the risk of death from breast cancer.23
5.2 Data
The data used in this analysis are from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS is a
nationallyrepresentativebiennialpanelstudyofbirthcohorts1931through1941andtheirspouses
as of 1992. The initial sample includes 12,652 persons in about 7,600 households who have been
interviewed every two years since 1992. The most recent available data are for year 2008 (wave
9). The survey history and design are described in more details in Juster and Suzman (1995).
Since the HRS started asking women questions about their usage of mammography in 1996, our
sample is limited to women interviewed in the HRS from 1996 to 2008. We focus on the age group
51 to 64, and exclude those observations with missing values for any of the critical variables.24
We also exclude those who have ever been diagnosed of (breast) cancer,25 since those who are
diagnosed of cancer might be of a different group who do not make decisions on mammography
or any other preventive health care the same way as do others. Our ﬁnal sample consists of 12,307
observations (each observation is a two-period short panel pooled from two consecutive waves)
for 7,021 individuals.
20Source: American Cancer Society.
21Also note that ﬁnding breast cancers early with mammography has also meant that many more women being
treated for breast cancer are able to keep their breasts. When caught early, localized cancers can be removed without
resorting to breast removal.
22See American Cancer Society website: http://www.cancer.org/Cancer/BreastCancer/DetailedGuide. Women age
40 and older should have a screening mammogram every year and should continue to do so for as long as they are in
good health.
23The new guideline by the U.S. Preventive Service Task Force issued in November of 2009 changed its recommenda-
tion for women in their 40s. Now the guideline recommends that women in their 40s should not get routine mammo-
grams for early detection of breast cancer. For women ages 50 to 74, it recommends routine mammography screenings
every two years. The American Cancer Society maintains its original recommendation that women from their 40s
should seek annual mammography.
24The key variables are education status, non-Hispanic white, education, self-reported health, insurance status,
whether father and mother are alive or died after age 70, father and mothers education, income, and mammography
usage (see Table 3 for their summary statistics).
25For those who entered in 1992 (i.e. the ﬁrst wave), we know whether they have been diagnosed of breast cancer as
of 1992. But for those who entered HRS in later waves, we only know whether any cancer has been diagnosed of since
the survey from 1994 did not ask about breast cancer speciﬁcally.
255.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 provides summary statistics of the key variables for the sample we use in our empirical
analysis. The sample of women we select are aged from 51 to 64 (note that we are combining two-
period panels using individuals that appear in two consecutive samples), with an average age of
57.8. A large majority of the sample are non-Hispanic white (80%) and with at least high school
education (78%). The average household income in our sample is about 49,680 dollars. 23% of the
sample has a self-reported bad health and about 76% of the women undertook mammogram in
the survey year. About 1.5% of the women who were surveyed in a wave died within two years.
72% of our sample reported having at least one insurance plan. Finally, about 75% of the mothers
(respectively, about 61% of the fathers) of the women in our sample are either still alive or died
at age greater than 70 at the time of the interview. 43% of the mothers (respectively, about 40% of
the fathers) of the women in our sample ﬁnished at least high school. From one wave to the next
wave, there is slight increase in the fraction of survivors who report bad health (an increase from
23% to 25%).
5.4 Decision Time Line
Figure 1 depicts the time line for mammography decisions for women in our sample. As we
mentioned earlier, we only consider women who are alive and have not yet been diagnosed with
anycancer(thusnotbreastcancer)intheﬁrstperiod. Givenherperiod-1statevariables, shemakes
the decision of whether to undertake mammography. Mammography detects breast cancer with
very high probability, though not for certain, if the woman has breast cancer. In the event that the
woman has breast cancer, early detection of breast cancer will lead to higher survival probability.
To fully capture the diagnostic nature of mammography, we would need to have information
about whether the woman has breast cancer at any period, and estimate the probability of detect-
ing breast cancer with (p1 in Figure 1) and without (p2 in Figure 1) mammogram. However, we do
not have access to such data. In HRS, even though we have information on women’s mammogra-
phy choices from 1996 on and we know whether their doctors have told them that they have any
cancer, we do not have information on which kind of cancer they have been diagnosed of.26
Due to these data issues, we decide to go directly from the mammography decision to the
live/death outcome and health status if alive (see our empirical speciﬁcation below), without
going through the intermediate step (having breast cancer or not). That is, we simply capture the
ultimate effect of undertaking mammography as to lower the probability of dying, and to lower
26Even for those over age 65 with matching Medicare claim data, the number of observations is not big enough for
us to get the needed probabilities of being diagnosed with breast cancer with and without mammography stratiﬁed by
all the state variables we want to control in our model such as age, race, health status, income, and education status.
26Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Mammogram 0.760 0.427 0 1 12307
Bad Health 0.230 0.421 0 1 12307
Married 0.704 0.456 0 1 12307
White (Non-Hispanic) 0.797 0.402 0 1 12307
High School 0.775 0.417 0 1 12307
Age 57.82 3.95 51 64 12307
Death 0.015 0.120 0 1 12307
Insurance 0.720 0.449 0 1 12307
Household Income ($1000) 49.68 68.34 0.101 2,136 12307
Log of Household Income 10.31 1.06 4.62 14.57 12307
Mother Still Alive or Died After Age 70 0.750 0.432 0 1 12307
Mother Education (High School or Higher) 0.431 0.495 0 1 12307
Father Still Alive or Died After Age 70 0.611 0.488 0 1 12307
Father Education (High School or Higher) 0.404 0.491 0 1 12307
Bad Health (t + 1) 0.249 0.432 0 1 12128
Household Income (t + 1) ($1000) 48.75 178.70 0.103 17,600 12128
Log of Household Income (t + 1) 10.27 1.05 4.64 16.68 12128
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Key Variables in the Estimation Sample.
Note: The last three variables in the table are observed only for those who survive to the second period.
27Alive and Does Not
Detect Breast Cancer
Mammogram No Mammogram
Detect Does Not Detect Detect Does Not Detect
































































Figure 1: The Timeline for Mammography Decisions.
Notes: (1). p1 > p2: mammogram can detect breast cancer at its early stage; p3 > p4: survival rate is higher
when breast cancer is detected at earlier stage.
(2). The states with rectangular framebox are those in which she will keep making decisions on whether to undertake
mammography.
the probability of being in bad health status if alive.
5.5 Empirical Speciﬁcation
For this application, we assume that each woman in our sample decides whether or not to
undertake mammography each period (i = 1 if she does and i = 0 if she does not). From the
previoussectiononidentiﬁcation, weneedtoimposesomenormalizationofthecontemporaneous
utilities. We normalize the individual’s instantaneous utility at the death state to be zero. Note
that no decision is necessary if one reaches the death state.
Now we describe the state variables we use in our empirical speciﬁcation. They include: Age
(AGE); Education Status (HIGHSCHOOL); Bad Health (BADHEALTH) which indicates whether the
individual self reports bad health; Log of Per Capita Income (LOGINCOME), Death (DEATH) and
whether her mother is still alive or died at age greater than 70 (MOTHER70).
If an individual stays alive, then we specify her utility from taking mammogram relative to not
taking mammogram as:
u1 (x)   u0 (x) = 0 + 1BADHEALTH + 2LOGINCOME + "t; (28)
28where “BADHEALTH” is a binary variable indicating whether the agent is in bad health or not
at time t; “LOGINCOME” denotes the logarithm of household income of the agent at time t, 0
and 1 are the utility parameters, and "t denotes difference in the choice-speciﬁc utility shocks
at time t. It is important to remark that even though the other state variables AGE, WHITE and
HIGHSCHOOL do not show up in the above speciﬁcation, it does not mean that these variables do
not affect the instantaneous utility of the individual; what it means is that these variables affect
the instantaneous utility under action 1 (mammogram) and action 0 (no mammogram) in exactly
the same way.
The agents make their decisions about whether to get mammography by comparing the ex-
pected summations of current and discounted future utilities from each choice. Individuals are
uncertain about their future survival probabilities, and if alive, the transition probabilities of fu-
ture health and income. These probabilities depend on their choices about whether or not to
get mammography; time-variant state variables including their lagged health status, their lagged
income, and their age, denoted as AGE; and time-invariant state variables including their race,
denoted by a binary variable WHITE, their education status HIGHSCHOOL, and the longevity of
their mothers, denoted by the binary variable MOTHER70 which takes value 1 if the mother is still
alive or died at the age older than 70 and 0 otherwise, and MOTHERHIGHSCHOOL (a binary vari-
able which takes value 1 if mother ﬁnished high school or more, and 0 otherwise), or analogously,
FATHER70 and FATHERHIGHSCHOOL (see Table 5 for the speciﬁcations).
Exclusion Variables. From the assumptions for exclusion restriction variables (see Assumption
5), we know that any variables that do not enter the relevant instantaneous payoff (after normal-
ization), i.e. u1 (x)   u0 (x); but affect the transition of payoff relevant state variables, can qualify
as exclusion variables. Since only the variables BADHEALTH; LOGINCOME and DEATH enter the
instantaneous payoff functions (after normalization), the other variables that affect the transition
of the above three variables can all qualify as potential exclusion restriction variables, including
MOTHER70, WHITE, MARRIED, HIGH SCHOOL, AGE, or any other variables that one may ﬁnd to
have important effects on the transition of the state variables relevant to the instantaneous payoff
functions, but do not directly affect the instantaneous payoff function (e.g., we experimented with
insurance status in some of our speciﬁcations).27 In what follows, we report estimation results
under two sets of exclusion variables. The sets of exclusion restriction variables are listed in the
last panel in Table 6, and they differ in whether we use MOTHER70 and MOTHERHIGHSCHOOL
or we use FATHER70 and FATHERHIGHSCHOOL. The ﬁrst step estimates reported in Table 4 and
27See, e.g., Ayanian et al (1993) and Decker (2005) for the relationship between health insurance and health outcomes
for women with breast cancer.
29Variable (1) (2)
Coeff. Est. Std. Err. Coeff. Est. Std. Err.
BADHEALTH 0.049 (0.059) 0.022 (0.062)
MARRIED 0.220*** (0.058) 0.212*** (0.060)
WHITE -0.212*** (0.060) -0.159*** (0.062)
INSURANCE 0.351*** (0.048) 0.354*** (0.050)
HIGHSCHOOL 0.373*** (0.061) 0.347*** (0.063)





AGE 0.008 (0.006) 0.007 (0.006)
CONSTANT -3.032*** (0.451) -3.185*** (0.471)
Pseudo-R2 0.0385 0.0380
Table 4: Determinants of Mammography Decisions: The Choice Probabilities from Logit Regres-
sion.
Notes: *, **, *** represents statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors are presented.
5, as well as Figure 2, suggest that both mother and father side variables affect the transitions of
the payoff relevant state variables.
5.6 Estimation Results
5.6.1 First Step Estimates
As we noted earlier, our estimation strategy has two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we need to use
the data to estimate choice probabilities, and the state transitions. Here we report these ﬁrst-step
estimation results. The choice probabilities and the death probability are estimated using Logit
regressions; but the transition of BADHEALTH and LOGINCOME are estimated non-parametrically.
Logit Estimates of the Probability of Choosing Mammography as a Function of The State
Variables. Table 4 produces the reduced form Logit regression results for the determinants of
whether a woman will undertake mammogram in a given year under two speciﬁcations on the
exclusion variables. Column (1) uses MOTHER70 and MOTHERHIGHSCHOOL together with other
exclusion variables, while Column (2) uses FATHER70 and FATHERHIGHSCHOOL instead. In the
30Variable (1) (2)
Coeff. Est. Std. Err. Coeff. Est. Std. Err.
MAMMOGRAM -0.525*** (0.174) -0.498*** (0.182)
BADHEALTH 1.733*** (0.191) 1.715*** (0.193)
MARRIED 0.105 (0.197) 0.165 (0.202)
WHITE -0.132 (0.191) -0.105 (0.202)
INSURANCE 0.209 (0.193) 0.357* (0.205)
HIGHSCHOOL 0.295 (0.198) 0.400* (0.206)





AGE 0.073*** (0.022) 0.067*** (0.017)
CONSTANT -6.609*** (1.557) 5.20 (20.47)
Pseudo-R2 0.1073 0.1055
Table 5: Determinants of Probability of Dying in Two Years.
Notes: *, **, *** represents statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors are presented.
speciﬁcation reported in Column (1), we ﬁnd that women who are married with higher house-
hold income, with high school education, and with health insurance are more likely to undertake
mammograms, while white women are less likely than black women to undertake mammogram.
All these coefﬁcient estimates are signiﬁcant at 1%. Interestingly, we also ﬁnd that women whose
mothersarestillaliveordiedafterage70arelesslikely, butthosewhosemothershaveatleasthigh
school are more likely to undertake mammograms. Finally, older women and women with bad
health are more likely to undertake mammogram, though these coefﬁcients are not statistically
different from zero.
In the speciﬁcation reported in Column (2), where we use the information about women’s
father as the exclusion variables, none of the other coefﬁcient estimates change qualitatively. In-
terestingly we found that FATHER70 and FATHERHIGHSCHOOL both positively affect women’s
probability of undertaking mammogram.28
28Note that the coefﬁcient estimates from such reduced form regressions, while informative, does not shed light on
the mechanisms under which the observed relationships between a variable and the mammogram decision arises. For
example, we see in Table 4 that women whose mother is still alive or died after age 70 are less likely to undertake
mammogram. But it is not clear from the table why. The structural analysis we undertake below will help us to achieve
31Transition Probabilities of the Payoff Relevant State Variables: Determinants of the Probabil-
ity of Dying in Two Years Table 5 reports the Logit regression results for the probability of dying
in two years, again using two sets of exclusion variables, with Column (1) using MOTHER70 and
MOTHERHIGHSCHOOL and Column (2) using FATHER70 and FATHERHIGHSCHOOL. The coefﬁ-
cient estimates show that undertaking mammogram signiﬁcantly lowers the probability of death
(notice that the average age of the sample is about 58 years). Not surprisingly, women with bad
health are more likely to die, but mammogram reduces the probability of dying conditional on
bad health. Also note that women whose mothers are either still alive or died after age 70 as well
as women whose fathers are either still alive or died after age 70, are less likely to die, suggesting
a genetic link of longevity between mothers as well as fathers and daughters.
Transition Probabilities of the Payoff Relevant State Variables: Evolution of Bad Health in Two
Years Figure 2 depicts a subset of the results from the non-parametric estimation of the evolution
of BADHEALTH for a selective combinations of the other state variables and the mammogram
choice, for our exclusion restriction variable speciﬁcation listed in Column (1) in Table 6. For
example, Panel (a) shows that how the probability of having bad health in period 2 is affected by
mammogram decision in the previous period and LOGINCOME, for women whose mothers are
alive or died after age 70 and had bad health in the previous period. It shows that the probability
of bad health decreases with Log Income, and is lower if one undertakes mammogram in the
previousperiod. Similarnegativerelationshipbetweentheprobabilityofbadhealthandincomeis
alsoshowninotherpanels. Acrossallpanels, weseethatmammogramalwaysreducesprobability
of bad health , and good health in the previous period predicts a higher probability of good health
this period, and mother living or having died after 70 reduces the probability of bad health. A
similar non-parametric estimation of LOGINCOME is also conducted.
5.6.2 Second Step Estimates: Utility Parameters and Discount Factors
Table 6 reports the estimation results for the parameters in the instantaneous utility function
speciﬁcation (28) and the identiﬁed discount factors ,  and ~ , as well as standard errors cal-
culated from the asymptotic distributions of the maximum pseudo-likelihood estimator. We re-
port results from two speciﬁcations using different sets of exclusion restriction variables. In the
speciﬁcation reported in Column 1, we include only WHITE, AGE, MARRIED, HIGHSCHOOL, IN-
SURANCE, MOTHER70, and MOTHERHIGHSCHOOL as the exclusion restriction variables, while
in the speciﬁcation reported in Column 2, we replace MOTHER70, and MOTHERHIGHSCHOOL by
FATHER70, and FATHERHIGHSCHOOL.














































































































































































Panel C: Hypothesis Tests
H0 :  = 1 Reject Reject











Table 6: Parameter Estimates for the Instantaneous Utility Function and Time Preference Parame-
ters Under Two Sets of Exclusive Restriction Variables.
Notes: (1). The last panel indicates the exclusive restriction variables used in the speciﬁcation in that column,
with ”Yes” meaning the variable is used, and ”No” otherwise; (2). Standard errors for parameter estimates are in
parenthesis, and *** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level; (3). For hypothesis tests reported in Panel C, all are rejected with
p-value less than 0:01.
34The parameter estimates, both for the instantaneous payoff function parameters and the time
preference parameters, are quite similar both qualitatively and quantitatively, across the two spec-
iﬁcations. We ﬁnd that having bad health lowers the utility of undertaking mammography rela-
tive to not undertaking mammography. We also found that the relative utility of undertaking
mammography increases with income, consistent with the ﬁnding in Table 4 that women with
higher incomes are more likely to undertake mammography. The estimated negative constant
term, though not statistically signiﬁcant for speciﬁcation 1, is consistent with the idea that preven-
tative health care typically involves huge one time instantaneous cost, which once combined with
present bias and naivety about present bias might lead to undesirable health-related decisions.
More interestingly, we estimate ,  and ~  to be 0.722, 0.718 and 0.9999 respectively in speci-
ﬁcation 1 and 0.795, 0.752, and 0.9999 respectively in speciﬁcation 2. These point estimates show
that women exhibit substantial present bias ( < 1) as well as naivety about their present bias
(~  > ) when making mammography decisions. In Panel C, we reported the results from three
hypothesis tests: the null hypothesis  = 1 (no present bias) and ~  =  (no naivety) are rejected
under both speciﬁcations with p-value less than 0.01.
It is also interesting to compare our estimates for  with what is in the literature. Using the
estimates of  and  reported in Table 6, we have that our estimates for  is equal to 0:7180:722 
0:518 under speciﬁcation 1 and is equal to 0:752  0:795  0:598 under speciﬁcation 2: This can be
compared with the estimate in Fang and Silverman (2009) where they estimate  to be 0.338 and 
to be 0.88, with   0:30 for a group of single mothers with dependent children. It is important to
note that our sample period is two years, while Fang and Silverman (2009)’s sample period is one
year; also the sample of women in this paper are older and have very different social economic
status (e.g. education and income) from the sample in Fang and Silverman (2009).
5.7 Counterfactual Experiments
Table 7 reports the mammography compliance rates predicted by the model and implied by
two counterfactual experiments where in experiment [1], we assess the mammography rates pre-
dicted by the model if we hypothetically set ~  equal to the estimated ^ ; and in experiment [2],
we set both ~  and  to 1. Experiment [1] allows us to assess the impact of naivety on mammog-
raphy take-up rate, while experiment [2] allows us to assess the impact of both present bias and
the naivety about present bias. If women in our sample are present-biased but fully sophisti-
cated (i.e. in experiment 1), then the mammography compliance rate increases from 76.12% in the
data to 77.96%, and both are which is very similar to a baseline model predicted compliance rate
(76.09%). If, however, we have a case where the agents are exponential discounters (i.e., in exper-






[1] No Naivety: ~  = [= ^ ] 0.7796 0.7874
[2] No Naivety and No Present Bias: ~  =  = 1 0.8196 0.8099
Table 7: Mammography Compliance Rates Predicted by the Model and Implied by Different
Counterfactual Experiments.
Notes: (1). The sample sizes slightly vary as we change the set of the exclusive restriction variables, which ex-
plains the changes in the mommography compliance rates in the data; (2). The exclusive restriction variables used in
Columns 1 and 2 corresponds to those used in speciﬁcations 1 and 2 in Table 6 respectively.
from 76.12% to 81.96%, which represents a 23:5% (= [(1   0:7612)   (1   0:8196)]=(1   0:7512))
reduction in the mammography noncompliance rate. Thus, time-inconsistent preferences caused
by present-bias and naivety about present-bias indeed have signiﬁcant policy implications for the
low compliance rates of preventive health care in the U.S.
6 Conclusion and Discussions
This paper extends the semi-parametric identiﬁcation and estimation method for dynamic dis-
crete choice models using Hotz and Miller’s (1993) conditional choice probability (CCP) approach
to the setting where individuals may have hyperbolic discounting time preferences and may be
naive about their time inconsistency.
Our analysis showed that the three discount factors, the present bias factor ; the standard
discount factor  and the perceived present bias factor ~  for naive agents can be separately iden-
tiﬁed. The key identifying restriction is that there exist variables that do not directly enter the
instantaneous utility function but affect the transition of other payoff relevant state variables.
We proposed two estimation strategies based on the identiﬁcation argument, and implement
the proposed estimation method to the decisions of undertaking mammography to evaluate the
importance of present bias and naivety in the under-utilization of mammography. Our estimates
are consistent with the presence of both present bias and naivety about present bias. In our coun-
terfactual experiments, we found that time-inconsistent preferences caused by present-bias and
naivety about present-bias indeed have signiﬁcant policy implications for the compliance rates of
mammography take-up rates.
36In our paper, we also assume that the model is stationary. In many applications, such station-
arity assumption may not be valid. However, we show in the Appendix that the identiﬁcation
arguments, properly modiﬁed, still work for the case of ﬁnite horizon models with non-stationary
state transitions. Of course, estimating ﬁnite horizon models with non-stationary state transitions
requires longer panels.
In this paper, we assumed that other than the choice-speciﬁc idiosyncratic payoff shocks,
which we assume to be serially and cross-sectionally independent, we do not allow for any ob-
served heterogeneity or unobserved state variables among individuals. Recent results by Kasa-
hara and Shimotsu (2009) and Hu and Shum (2009) show that the conditional choice probabil-
ities, which are crucial for implementing Hotz-Miller type estimators, can be identiﬁed in the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity or unobserved state variables in the context of dynamic
discrete choice models with exponential discounting.29 Whether their arguments still work for
dynamic discrete choice models with hyperbolic discounting preferences remains an open ques-
tion. Provided that conditional choice probabilities for any given state, including both observed
and unobserved state variables, can be identiﬁed, the estimation methods we proposed here may
be still valid. This is an important question we will examine in future research.
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40A Finite Horizon with Non-Stationary State Transition
This Appendix discusses the identiﬁcation strategy for a dynamic discrete choice model for
(potentially naive) hyperbolic discounters with ﬁnite horizon and non-stationary state transitions.
The time period in this case goes from t, the current period, until T, the end of horizon. In this
section, we will use superscripts t;t+1;t+2;:::;T to denote the time period for all the components
in our analysis for clariﬁcation. The discussion in this section will be shorter and less detailed that
that in Section 2, as will soon be clear that the identiﬁcation strategy for this non-stationary case is
essentially the same as the one for the stationary case, with only minor modiﬁcation.











Then, deﬁne the choice-speciﬁc value function of the next-period self as perceived by the current
self, Zt+1
i (xt+1), as follows:
Zt+1
i (xt+1) = ut+1
i (xt+1) + ~ 
X
xt+22X
V t+2 (xt+2)(xt+2jxt+1;i): (A2)
Given Zt+1
i (xt+1), we know that the current self’s perception of her future self’s choice, i.e., ~ 




















i (xt+1) + "i;t+1

:
Let us deﬁne the probability of choosing alternative j by the the next period self as perceived
by the current period self, ~ Pj (xt+1), when next period state is xt+1 :
~ Pt+1




j (xt+1) + "j;t+1  Zt+1





i (xt+1) = ut+1








i (xt+1) + "t+1
i

where i is the chosen alternative according to ~  (xt+1;"t+1). Thus it must
satisfy the following relationship:
V t+1 (xt+1) = E"t+1
h
V t+1




Now note from (A2) and (A3), we have
V t+1
i (xt+1) = Zt+1
i (xt+1) +







The relationship in (A5) is crucial as it allows us to rewrite (A4) as:
V t+1 (xt+1) = E"t+1
h
V t







i (xt+1) + "~ (xt+1;"t+1);t
+
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The probability of observing action i being chosen at a given state variable x, in this non-
stationary case, is still:
Pt
i (xt) = Pr

Wt




















i (xt) is the current-period self’s equilibrium choice probabilities and will be observed in
the data.






























Using (A8) and (A9), we can rewrite (A6) as



































i = V T
i
which leads to:









Equations (A11) and (A2) combined give us ZT 1
i , which can be further combined with equa-
tions (A9) and (A10) for t = T   1 to give us V T 1. We can keep doing backward induction in
this way until we reach V t+1, which can be used in (A1) to derive Wt
i , the current choice speciﬁc
continuation value function. Equation (A7) shows the relationship between the observed choice
pattern from the data and Wt
i .
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